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Abstract 
 
         It is suggested that some shortcomings of Null Hypothesis Significance Testing 
(NHST), viewed from the perspective of Bayesian statistics, turn benign once the 
traditional threshold p value of .05 is substituted by a sufficiently smaller value. To 
illustrate, the posterior probability of H0 stating P=.5, given data that just render it rejected 
by NHST with a p value of .05 (and a uniform prior), is shown here to be not much smaller 
than .50 for most values of N below 100 (and even exceeds .50 for N≥100); in contrast, 
with a p value of .001 posterior probability does not exceed .06 for N≤100 (neither .25 for 
N<9000). Yet more interesting, posterior probability becomes quite independent of N with 
a p value of .0001, hence practically satisfying the α postulate – set by Cornfield (1966) as 
the condition for p value being a measure of evidence in itself. In view of the low prospect 
that most researchers will soon convert to use Bayesian statistics in any form, we thus 
suggest that researchers who elect the conservative option of resorting to NHST be 
encouraged to avoid as much as possible using a p value of .05 as a threshold for rejecting 
H0. The analysis presented here may be used to discuss afresh which level of threshold p 
value seems to be a reasonable, practical substitute. 
 
 
 
 
 
Highlights 
 
• We argue that some shortcomings of NHST are not as irreparable as sometimes presented 
• Posterior probability of a H0 rejected with p value of .05 hovers around chance level 
• That probability is much smaller and much less dependent on N, the lower p value is 
• We suggest using as threshold significance level p values much smaller than .05 
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 Null Hypothesis Significance Testing (NHST) is being employed as the main 
inference tool in experimental studies despite the longstanding scholarly controversy over 
its use. That dispute started roughly at the time that Ronald Fisher began criticizing other 
statisticians, among them J. Neyman and M.G. Kendall, for overstretching and convoluting 
his rudimentary idea of the null hypothesis, as he had first introduced1 in Fisher (1925) and 
brilliantly explained a decade later (Fisher, 1935; cf review in Salsberg, 2001).  
The use of NHST grew considerably more controversial in recent decades in light 
of several concerns (see, e.g., Bakan, 1966; Campbell, 1982; Carver, 1978, 1993; Cohen, 
1990, 1994; Edwards, Lindman & Savage, 1963; Falk & Greenbaum, 1995; Hunter, 1997; 
Krantz, 1999; Krueger, 2001; Lykken, 1968; Nickerson, 2000; Simmons, Nelson & 
Simonsohn, 2011; Wilson, Miller & Lower, 1967; and lately, Nuzzo, 2014). A prominent 
concern is that NHST does not measure evidential weight, rather resorts to collapsing a 
continuum of evidential weight into a binary decision (reject/accept H0), thereby nullifying 
the potential impact of any piece of evidence that fails to meet, even just barely, the 
significance criterion, often for quite prosaic reasons (budgetary constraints, for example). 
Another worry is that NHST focuses on the cost of a false positive while almost neglecting 
the value of a true positive (Killeen, 2006). Vehement NHST critics, like Armstrong (2007) 
and Krueger (2001), deplore what one of them (Krueger, ibid, p.16) called “the survival of a 
flawed method” and others designated as an instance of “trained incapacity” (Ziliak & 
McCloskey, 2008, p. 238) or of a “cult” (ibid, book’s title). Consequently, reliance on 
confidence intervals and effect sizes has increased in last decades (e.g., Kline, 2004) and 
is now advocated by quite a few authors to officially replace use of NHST (e.g., Cumming, 
2013).  
On the other hand, there is no consensus that NHST is basically wrong (see, e.g., 
Hagen, 1997; Mogie, 2004; Nickerson, 2000). Nickerson chose to summarize his thorough 
review of the controversy as follows: "NHST is easily misunderstood and misused but 
when applied with good judgment it can be an effective aid to the interpretation of 
experimental data" (ibid, p. 241). One way or the other, it is a fact that NHST is still applied 
to research data almost as prevalently as before (as noted in Lakens & Evers, 2014, p. 
284), not the least because it is still required in many publication manuals of scholarly 
journals.  
True, many people doing research in psychology fail to heed the warnings about 
NHST made in textbooks of statistics for psychologists (and refreshed from time to time in 
articles such as those cited above). Some of them are not fully aware of its logic, 
sometimes to the point of failing to notice grave fallacies in its interpretation, such as the 
fallacy in the claim "p = .05 entails that the likelihood that H0 is true is about 1 in 20". For 
them, at least, a reminder is surely not gratuitous. However, it is doubtful that having been 
corrected, they would ever become sufficiently disillusioned with NHST as to become 
amenable to an advice to substitute it with an alternative.  
 4 
 
Moreover, the chief alternative to NHST, Bayesian analysis (see, e.g., Kruschke, 
2013; Wagenmakers, 2007) - well-founded and elegant as it may be - is unfortunately too 
sophisticated to be widely used by researchers who have not been sufficiently trained to 
apply it (and may be questionably satisfactory in itself; see Killeen, 2006, 2006a). Hence, 
revolutionary ideas, such as a call to ban the use of NHST (Hunter, 1997), seem so far 
short of being practical for the time being.  
 A proposal (Wagenmakers, ibid) to adopt a simple shortcut for obtaining posterior 
probabilities of H0 (the Bayesian information criterion; Bic, for short) is yet to prove 
sufficiently acceptable and convenient. Using instead Bayes-factor calculators (Morey, 
Rouder, & Jamil, 2014), albeit possibly more accessible, may not prove very useful until 
users were sufficiently versed in the logic of Bayesian inference. The fate of another 
sophisticated methodology recently proposed – the decision theory for science (DTS for 
short; Killeen, 2006a) - may be found similarly hard to practice for a similar reason. 
The repeated exposure of researchers to shortcomings of NHST might eventually 
amount to a critical mass sufficient for outweighing the resistance and conservatism that 
as yet keep it afloat. However, granting that it is not clear that a full blown rejection of 
NHST is on the horizon, perhaps something can be done to attain a more modest, yet 
feasible, objective that may present the lesser evil within the traditional framework, namely 
cases in which researchers do apply NHST (or report whether or not a variate value of 
special theoretical interest - such as µ=0 - falls within a predetermined confidence interval).  
Some attempts in that spirit have already been done. Realizing that “NHST is here 
to stay” (Krueger, ibid, p. 25), some authors presented ways to evaluate evidential value of 
studies in view of NHST results (Lakens & Evers, 2014), or insisted that hypothesis-testing 
methods in the broad sense are nonetheless crucial (see Morey, Rouder, Verhagen & 
Wagenmakers, 2014). 
In keeping with that, we suggest that it may be possible, somewhat ironically, to 
use Bayesian logic to decide how to more reasonably apply NHST, which should allow 
researchers to keep practicing the latter. Some progress in that direction can be made, 
once it is acknowledged that although p values lie on a continuum, it is possible to re-
classify the specific effects of using any particular value as "dubious" and "benign" in a 
way that is not arbitrary. Moreover, the dividing line differs from the traditional threshold of 
.05 (or equivalently, a 95% confidence interval).  
To show that, let us confine the discussion to the use of NHST and examine the 
issue by three criteria – (a) posterior probability of H0, (b) dependence of that posterior 
probability on sample size, (c) replicability.  
 
Posterior probability and its dependence on sample size 
For a start, consider the first two criteria. In the following, we extend an argument 
made by Wagenmakers (2007) to demonstrate a grave drawback of NHST warranting 
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conversion to Bayesian inference, to rather suggest a way to counter that drawback within 
the framework of NHST in a quite simple way.  
The drawback pointed to by Wagenmakers is that a p value does not qualify as a 
measure of statistical evidence, since it fails to satisfy the requirement (denoted by him as 
the p postulate; cf the term α postulate in Cornfield, 1966) that “identical p values convey 
identical levels of evidence, irrespective of sample size” (Wagenmakers, 2007, pp 779-
780). He illustrated that failure by showing that the posterior probability of H0 (e.g., one 
stating that the binomial parameter Θ, specifying the proportion of opting for a specific 
alternative in a set of choices between given two alternatives, equals .5), given data having 
p = .05, is quite high - falling just below .50 for Ns smaller than about 60, and furthermore 
grows dramatically as N increases - exceeding .50 approximately with N≥100.  
 Wagenmakers is right of course. Yet, it should be noted that although p values do 
not in principle satisfy the p postulate, in practice the extent by which the p postulate is 
violated by NHST may be reasonably tolerable with small enough p values.  
            To inspect that, we applied Wagenmakers’ procedure2 to a few other customarily 
used significance levels (.01, .001, .0001) in addition to .05 (Navon & Cohen, 2008). We 
used only the most conservative prior - the objective Beta (1,1), which is actually a uniform 
distribution over the whole range, and selected levels of N (20, 40, 60, 80, 100, 200, 400, 
600, 800, 1000, 2000, 4000, 6000, 8000, 10000), calculations for each are shown as 
separate points on the plotted graphs.  
The results are presented in Figure 1A. The slopes of the graphs relating posterior 
probability to N (within the range of commonly used N levels) become progressively 
smaller the lower the p value is: The slope that is large with a p value of .05 is still about as 
large with a p value of .01, but is considerably moderated with a p value of .001. With a p 
value of .0001, the posterior probability of H0 becomes almost independent of N, at least 
for most practical purposes (also, note the corresponding graph in Figure 1B, which is a 
magnified view of the leftmost side of Figure 1A).  
The growing robustness to N with more and more extreme p values imparts in itself 
increasing confidence that the decision to reject H0 is founded on a firm basis. Yet, 
confidence apart, how does level of significance affect evidential import?  
Unlike cases where the p value is .05 (and for that matter, also with 95% 
confidence intervals), with p values that are more extreme, the posterior probability of H0 is 
most often comfortably smaller than .50: With a p value of .0001, the probability is smaller 
than .06 throughout the range. With a p value of .001, the probability is smaller than .10 up 
to an N of about 1000, and reaches .25 only with an N of about 10000. With a p value of 
.01, the probability is smaller than .50 up to an N of about 1250. Consider, for example 
N=100. As can be seen in Figure 1B, whereas the posterior probability is about .52 with a 
p value of .05, it is about .22, .08, or less than .01 with p values of .01, .001., or .0001, 
respectively.  
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Figure 1.        The posterior probability of H0 (stating that the Binomial parameter Θ equals 
                  .5) [given (a) data that just render it rejected by NHST, (b) the objective  
                  prior], as a function of N (ranging from 20 to 10000 in increments specified in 
                  the text in panel A; ranging from 20 to 200 in panel B) and p value (05, .01,  
                  .001, or .0001).  
                       Notes: (a) The dashed horizontal lines (plotted at ordinate 
                  values of .10, .25 and .50) are meant just for reference. (b) The jitter apparent 
                  at some places along the graphs is due to the fact that since the variable 
                  "number of successes" is discrete, the p value corresponding to any given 
                  significance level often only approximates it; when the gap in actual p values  
                  for successive Ns is considerable, which might occur with small Ns, the  
                  monotonicity of the Pr(H0)-N graph may be violated.    
(A) 
(B) 
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Thus, the results for p values more extreme than .05 certainly look far more benign 
than the results for p = .05. The implication is that researchers are quite justified in 
concluding that the posterior odds of H0 (given the data of just a single experiment and a 
uniform prior) is clearly < 1, most often < 1/3, whenever having obtained a rejection with p  
≤ .001, let alone p  ≤ .0001. They are also right in concluding that the odds are < 1/2, and 
most often < 1/3, whenever having obtained a rejection with p ≤ .01 given that N ≤ 200 
(see Figure 1B).  
The latter condition is very frequently met in empirical studies. To illustrate (without 
any pretense for representative sampling): Out of the 42 experiments reported in some 
given issue of Psychonomic Bulletin and Review (Vol. 14, no. 5, October 2007), all used 
Ns < 200 (furthermore, 88% used Ns < 100 and 64% used Ns < 50). A further illustration 
concerns just tests of H0 stating P=.5: Out of the first 32 experiments found in a Google 
Scholar search with keywords "psychology" and "sign test", all used Ns < 200 
(furthermore, 84% used Ns < 100 and 59% used Ns < 50).  
All that seems to call for further evaluation of the time-honored tradition to consider 
.05 as the threshold p value allowing rejection of the null hypothesis. Note, a rejection with 
p ≤ .05 only enables one to determine that the posterior probability of H0 is < .50, namely 
that the posterior odds are smaller than 1, with Ns not greater than about 80. One may 
argue that that is an accomplishment decent enough for a single experiment given a 
uniform prior, actually about all a realistic researcher may ask for, considering that the 
scientific community rarely passes judgment on the basis of only a single experiment (see 
Krantz, 1999; Nickerson, 2000). On the other hand, the analysis above casts some doubts 
on the evidential import of a result with a p value of .05. To the extent that the doubts are 
grave enough to worry about, the analysis at the same time suggests that there is a 
straightforward remedy for that – adopting a more stringent threshold p value.  
 The traditional use of .05 as a threshold p value, namely the practice of reporting a 
result as significant only once its p value is at least as small as .05, must be somewhat 
arbitrary3. Any alternative way to set a threshold must be somewhat arbitrary as well. 
However, in retrospect one may prefer that the adopted threshold would severely reduce 
the number of cases in which the posterior odds of H0, given the most conservative prior, 
would hover around 1. Resetting the threshold to .01, the second most customary level, 
yields odds of about 1/3 or even less for the most commonly used N values. That seems a 
bit less arbitrary. Resetting it to .001 yields odds of about 1/20 or even less for those 
values of N. Resetting it to .0001 yields much smaller odds yet, hovering somewhere near 
1/100.  
    It is not for us to tell what the threshold p value should be, neither to recommend 
how that should be institutionally decided. Suffice it to note that it is possible to reset it in a 
way that would render the posterior odds minute enough, and its dependence on N small 
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enough, to satisfy even the most stringent. For a reasonable idea about how to do that, 
note suggestions made by Johnson in another article (Johnson, 2013), presenting 
conclusions roughly similar to those we independently make here (some of which already 
mentioned in Navon & Cohen, 2008).   
 
Replicability 
Another, not unrelated, reason to consider this suggestion is the substantial 
difference between .05 and .01 (let alone yet-more-extreme p values) vis-à-vis another 
criterion – replicability - argued by some to be no less meaningful as an inference tool than 
p values. Following Greenwald, Gonzales, Harris & Guthrie (1996) who defined replicability 
as the probability of rejecting again (with a p value of .05 at most) a false null hypothesis, 
Krueger (2001) expanded the definition for all possible values of prior probability of H0. He 
illustrated, for three selected values of Pr(H0), how replicability depends on the value 
observed in the first rejection (see ibid, Figure 2).  
In a recent large-scale open science collaboration (Aarts et al, 2015) meant to 
assess rates of replication (using the definition suggested by Greenwald et al, ibid) of 100 
studies published in all 2008 issues of three psychology journals, it was found that 
whereas only 18% original studies with p<0.04 were replicated, replication rate was 63% 
for original studies with p<0.001.  
KiIleen (2005) developed a general formula for transforming a p value to the 
probability of replicating the sign of a statistically significant effect that he termed prep (cf. 
KiIleen, 2005, 2006; Sanbaria & Killeen, 2007). That proposed alternative to NHST 
received quite a few interpretations as well as critical reactions (see short review of 
commentaries in Cumming, 2010). Later, Miller & Schwarz (2011) raised further doubts 
about the potential of the prep measure to supplant NHST, due to what they considered 
“formidable source of uncertainty associated with estimation of replication probability for a 
particular experimental effect of interest” (ibid, p. 359).  
Yet, that measure, inadequate in itself as it may be qua substitute for NHST, may 
at least inform us how to practice NHST, by providing some gross idea of how the notion of 
replicability (however being specifically formulated) relates to p value, for example whether 
an effect found to have a p value of .05 could be satisfactorily replicable.  
 For whatever it is worth to gauge replicability, the prep measure indicates that 
replicability heavily depends on p value: According to that index, whereas replicability of a 
result having a p value of .05 is ~.877, replicability is considerably higher for results 
significant with a p value of .01 (~.950), let alone with a p value of .001 (~.986), much less 
.0001 (~.996). In other words, while a result having a p value just barely significant at the 
.05 level stands a considerable (.123) chance of failing to replicate, results having p values 
of about .01, .001 or .0001 are considerably less likely (.050, .014, or .004, respectively) to 
do that.  
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 Since it seems quite prudent to be worried about reporting a result as significant in 
case the replicability is not high enough (cf Greenwald et al, 1996 or Nuzzo, 2014), it 
makes sense to reset the threshold significance level (at least for a first rejection4) to .01, 
.001 or .0001, as deemed sufficiently satisfactory..  
 
Summary 
The two arguments discussed above suggest that resetting the threshold p value to 
.01, or even .001 or .0001, is not arbitrary at all. It is quite reasonable to expect that 
implementing that change would reduce both the rate of rejection of null hypotheses that 
are likely to be true (in the light of their posterior probability) and the rate of failures to 
replicate a result reported as significant.  
Obviously, the cost of such a move would be the need to increase power of tests, 
typically by collecting considerably more data (e.g., running more lab animals, recruiting 
more human respondents). Yet, as can be seen in Figure 1B, unlike cases in which power 
is increased to attain rejection of H0 at the .05 level - which results in reduced diagnosticity 
(viz, reduction in posterior odds in favor of H1; or put more plainly, decrement in the 
evidential value that H0 is false) - power increase invested in making H0 rejected at the .01 
level (rather than at the .05 level), let alone the other two levels, helps to gain a substantial 
rise in diagnosticity.  
For example, when testing H0: µ=40 against a true alternative µ=43, given σ=8, in 
order to obtain a β level of at most .02, minimal N should be 98 with α=.05, yet 137 with α 
=.01. As can be seen in Figure 1B, that modest increase (of ~40%) in N yields a quite 
substantial rise in diagnosticity - from ~1 to ~3 (namely, by ~200%). Returns of that order 
of magnitude would seem to warrant the added resource costs. That seems worthy of 
doing despite anticipated reluctance of researchers to undertake the extra burden.  
The question is what it would take to bring about such a reform. First, a decent 
support has to be garnered within the academic community. Subsequently, a change in 
behavior should follow.  
It is not clear how that could best be accomplished. We are not advocating 
anything in particular, certainly not enforcement through an intra-disciplinary institutional 
legislation. The gamut of possible alternatives to that is quite broad.  
An effective initial step would be the revision of textbooks. Students who are taught 
in undergraduate studies that an F statistics is considered significant only if its p value is 
no larger than .01, or .001 or .0001 (along with an historical note that people once used to 
pass as significant even p values as large as .05) are likely to internalize that and follow 
suit. Another step would be to bring about change in editorial policy and attitudes. Not long 
after journal editors start exhibiting discomfort towards results with p values less extreme 
than the reset threshold level, authors will presumably start adjusting their subjective 
standards of suitability for journal submission correspondingly.    
 10 
 
References 
 
Aarts, A.A. et al (open science collaboration) (2015). Estimating the reproducibility of 
     psychological science. Science, 349, issue 6251 (28 August). DOI:  
     10.1126/science.aac4716. 
 
Armstrong, J.S. (2007). Statistical significance tests are unnecessary even when properly 
      done and properly interpreted: Reply to commentaries. International Journal of 
      Forecasting, 23, 335–336. 
 
Bakan, D. (1966). The test of significance in psychological research. Psychological  
      Bulletin, 66, 423-437. 
 
Campbell, J.P. (1982). Some remarks from the outgoing editor. Journal of Applied 
     Psychology, 67, 691-700. 
 
Carver, R.P. (1978). The case against statistical hypothesis testing. Harvard Educational 
     Review, 48, 378-399.  
 
Carver, R.P. (1993). The case against statistical hypothesis testing, revisited. Journal of 
     Experimental Education, 61, 287-282.  
 
Cohen, J. (1990). Things I have learned (so far). American Psychologist, 45, 1304-1312. 
 
Cohen, J. (1994). The earth is round (p < .05). American Psychologist, 49, 997-1003. 
 
Cornfield, J. (1966). Sequential trials, sequential analysis, and the likelihood principle.  
      American Statistician, 20, 18-23.  
 
Cumming, G. (2010). Replication, prep, and Confidence Intervals: Comment Prompted by 
      Iverson, Wagenmakers, and Lee (2010); Lecoutre, Lecoutre, and Poitevineau (2010); 
      and Maraun and Gabriel (2010). Psychological Methods, 15, 192-198. 
 
Cumming, G.  (2013). The new statistics: Why and how. Psychological Science, 25, 7-29. 
 
Edwards, W., Lindman, H., & Savage, L.J. (1963). Bayesian statistical inference for 
      psychological research. Psychological Review, 70, 193-242. 
 
 
 11 
 
Falk, R., & Greenbaum, C.W. (1995). Significance levels die hard. Theory & Psychology,  
      5, 75-98. 
 
Fisher, R.A. (1935). The design of experiments. Oxford, England: Oliver & Boyd. 
 
Fisher, R.A. (1925). Statistical methods for research workers (1st ed.). Edinburgh: Oliver & 
     Boyd.   
 
Fisher, R.A. (1958). Statistical methods for research workers (13th ed.). Edinburgh: Oliver 
     & Boyd.   
 
Greenwald, A.G., Gonzales, R., Harris, R.J., & Guthrie, D. (1996). Effect size and p value:  
      What should be reported and what should be replicated? Psychphysiology, 33, 175- 
      183. 
 
Hagen, R.L. (1997).  In praise of the null hypothesis statistical test. American Psychologist,  
      52, 15-24. 
 
Hunter, J.E. (1997). Needed: A ban on the significance test. Psychological Science, 8, 3-7.  
 
Johnson, V.E. (2013). Revised standards for statistical evidence. Proceedings of the 
      National Academy Academy of Sciences, 110, 19313–19317. 
 
Killeen, P. R. (2005). An alternative to null hypothesis significance tests. Psychological 
      Science, 16, 345-353.  
 
Killeen, P. R. (2006). Beyond statistical inference: A decision theory for science. 
      Psychonomic Bulletin and Review , 13, 549-562. 
 
Killeen, P. R. (2006a). The problem with Bayes. Psychological Science, 17, 643-644.  
 
Kline, R.B (2004). Beyond significance testing: Reforming data analysis methods in 
      behavioral research. Washington, DC: APA Books.  
 
Krantz, D.H. (1999). The null hypothesis testing controversy in psychology. Journal of the 
      American Statistical Association, 44, 1372-1381. 
 
Krueger, J. (2001). Null hypothesis significance testing: On the survival of a flawed  
      method. American Psychologist, 56, 16-26.  
 12 
 
 
Kruschke, J. K. (2013).  Bayesian estimation supersedes the t test. Journal of 
      Experimental Psychology: General, 142, 573-603. 
 
Lakens, D., & Evers, E.R.K. (2014). Sailing from the seas of chaos into the corridor of 
      stability: Practical recommendations to increase the informational value of studies.  
      Perspectives on Psychological Science, 9, 278-292. 
 
Lykken, D.T. (1968). Statistical significance in psychological research. Psychological  
      Bulletin, 70, 151-159. 
 
Miller, J. & Schwarz, W. (2011). Aggregate and individual replication probability within an 
      explicit model of the research process. Psychological Methods, 16, 337-360. 
 
Mogie, M. (2004). In support of null hypothesis significance testing. Proceedings of the 
      Royal Society London B (Suppl.), 271, S82-S84.  
 
Morey, R.D., Rouder, J.N., Verhagen, J., & Jamil, T (2014). Package ‘BayesFactor’.  
     http://bayesfactorpcl.r-forge.r-project.org/ 
 
Morey, R.D., Rouder, J.N., Verhagen, J., & Wagenmakers, E.J (2014). Why hypothesis 
     tests are essential for psychological science: A comment on Cumming (2014).  
     Psychological Science, DOI: 10.1177/0956797614525969. 
 
Navon, D., & Cohen, Y. (2008). Is NHST as embarrassingly inadequate as following from 
     Wagenmakers' analysis? (A manuscript submitted in 2008 to Psychonomic Bulletin and 
     Review).  
 
Nickerson, R.S. (2000). Null hypothesis significance testing: A review of an old and 
     continuing controversy. Psychological Methods, 5, 241-301. 
 
Nuzzo, R. (2014). Statistical errors. Nature, 506, issue 7487 (13 February), 150-152. 
 
Rouder, J.N., & Morey, R.D. (2014). Package ‘BayesFactor’: Computation of Bayes factors 
      for common designs. radiomaryja.pl.eu.org. 
 
Salsburg, D. (2001). The Lady tasting tea: How statistics revolutionized science in the 
      twentieth century. New York: Henry Holt.  
 
 13 
 
Sanbaria, F., & Killeen, P.R. (2007). Better statistics for better decisions: Rejecting null  
       hypotheses statistical tests in favor of replication statistics. Psychology in the Schools,   
       44, 471-481. 
 
Simmons, J.P., Nelson, L.D., & Simonsohn, U. (2011). False-positive psychology: 
       Undisclosed flexibility in data collection and analysis allows presenting anything as 
       significant. Psychological Science, 22, 1359-1366. 
 
 
Wagenmakers, E.J. (2007). A practical solution to the pervasive problems of p values.   
      Psychonomic Bulletin and Review , 14, 779-804. 
 
Wilson, W. R., Miller, H., & J. S. Lower. (1967). Much ado about the null 
     hypothesis. Psychological Bulletin, 67,188-197. 
 
Ziliak, S.T., & McCloskey, D.N. (2008). The cult of statistical significance. Ann Arbor, 
     Michigan: The University of Michigan Press.  
 14 
 
 
  
Footnotes 
 
1.       Yet, while stressing that “tests of significance… should not be confused with 
automatic acceptance tests” (Fisher, 1958, p. 128), Fisher was far from questioning 
the logic of NHST, as he wrote in his preface to the 13th edition of Statistical methods 
for research workers: “Today exact tests of significance need no apology” (ibid, p. v). 
 
2.       Which amounts to the following, using Wagenmakers's own words (ibid, p. 792), 
with a few omissions and slight paraphrasing:    
The number of observations N was varied… and for each of these Ns we determined the 
number of successful decisions s that would result in an NHST p value that is barely 
significant at the .05 level, so that for these data p is effectively fixed at .05… Next, for the 
data that were constructed to have the same p value of .05, we calculated the Bayes 
factor Pr(D│H0) / Pr(D│H1) using the objective Beta (1,1) prior. From the Bayes factor, we 
then computed posterior probabilities for the null hypothesis.  
              Specifically, the posterior probability of the null hypothesis, Pr(H0), equals  
       l0 / (l0+l1), where l0 is the likelihood of the observed number of successes in N trials 
       given Θ= .5 (as the point hypothesis H0 has it), and l1 is the integral of the likelihoods 
       (of the observed number of successes in N trials) across all values of Θ within the 
       interval [0,1] (as the interval hypothesis H1 has it). 
 
3.       To illustrate, in an early reference to the notion of significant deviation (probably as 
early as the first edition of Statistical methods for research workers, published in 1925) 
Fisher himself mentioned the .05 level as just a conceivable threshold, as implied by 
the “if” in “if we take P=.05 as the limit of significant deviation…” (p. 82 in the 13th 
edition).   
 
4.       Once a null hypothesis has been rejected with reasonable confidence, so that - to 
use Bayesian terminology - Pr(H0) is considerably smaller than .5, there is less ground 
to worry about p values larger than .01. Actually, even a p value of .10 or .15 may be 
considered as a replication, albeit a weak one. If and when a meta-analysis is 
performed, all the recorded data would be input conjunctively and have their impacts 
respective with each one’s diagnostic value, high or low as the case may be.  
  
 
 
